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A ll too frequently the decision of who shall serve as trustee of a client's
inter vivos or testamentary trust is handled as another routine
mechanical detail, rather than being recognized as one of the most impor-
tant aspects of the trust creation process. Many times the selection of a
trustee is made almost as an afterthought, as the attorney and client are
concluding their planning conference. The hasty or careless selection of a
trustee, however, might render a meticulously planned dispositive arrange-
ment completely ineffective because of overlooked tax considerations.
This Article attempts to identify and discuss in depth the income and es-
tate tax considerations that are critical to the selection of a proper trustee.
Its purpose is to acquaint the reader with the trust provisions that most
often disrupt the anticipated smooth operation of a trust or give rise to
unexpected tax liabilities, and to suggest techniques for avoiding this result
with minimal sacrifice to the original dispositive intent of the gran-
tor/settlor.
I. GENERAL TAX CONSIDERATIONS
There are numerous traps for the unwary in the provisions of any trust
instrument. Failure to locate and provide for such traps can undermine an
estate plan by inadvertently triggering taxation of the trust income to the
grantor himself or by causing the trust property, or portions thereof, to be
included in the grantor's estate at his death. The following is a general
discussion of the income and estate tax provisions encountered when se-
lecting a trustee.
A. Identflcaton of the Grantor
The definition of the term "grantor" is nowhere to be found in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code;' that, in itself, should signal danger. In ordinary usage
the term means the creator of the trust, the settlor who originated the entity
t This Article is based on a presentation by Mr. Barbour at the November 2-4, 1978,
Symposium on Estate Planning, sponsored by Southern Methodist University School of Law
Center for Advanced Professional Development.
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Trinity University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. 6 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 37.04 n.15 (1975).
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and defined its limits.2 This is also the sense in which it is used for income
tax purposes.3 For estate tax purposes, "grantor" means a transferor, in
trust or otherwise, for less than adequate and full consideration; it means,
in other words, any donor.4 This is an important distinction. For exam-
ple, a grandfather creates a trust for his daughter and her children. The
trust instrument is carefully drafted to avoid any income or estate tax con-
sequences to the grandfather. Many years later the daughter decides to
make a contribution to the trust herself, taking advantage of the standard
provision that empowers any person to make such a contribution. For es-
tate tax purposes she has just become a grantor of the trust to the extent of
the value of her contribution.5 This same result, the conversion of a donor
into a grantor, may also come about via an inadvertent contribution. In
one case the Tax Court, relying on Internal Revenue Code section
2036(a)(1), included part of a trust in the estate of a life beneficiary be-
cause a state court ruled, after her death, that she had been entitled to
certain stock splits and stock dividends retained by the trust.6 The creator
of a reciprocal trust may be considered the grantor of the trust established
by another for his benefit.7 Moreover, the nominal creator of a trust may
not be the grantor for estate tax purposes if the property was in fact con-
tributed by a third party.8 In community property jurisdictions, if commu-
nity property is used to fund the trust, each spouse is considered a grantor
to the extent of one-half of the transferred asset.9 The moral underlying
these examples is an important one: the trust instrument and the underly-
ing circumstances must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that all potential
and hidden grantors are planned for.
B. Income Taxation of Grantor Trusts
The reason that identification of the grantor or deemed grantor is crucial
to the selection of the trustee rests largely with the income tax laws pertain-
2. Van Vechten, The Grantor's Retention ofPowers as Trustee or Otherwise; Income and
Estate Tax Consequences, 25 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 943, 943 (1967).
3. Id.
4. Buhl v. Kavanagh, 118 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1941); National Bank of Commerce
v. Clauson, 127 F. Supp. 386, 391 (S.D. Me. 1955).
5. Nicholas A. Stavroudis, 27 T.C. 583 (1956).
6. Estate of Anna Hart Kinney, 39 T.C. 728 (1963).
7. Reciprocal trusts are found in situations where .4 transfers property in trust with
income to B for life, remainder to other named beneficiaries, and B transfers property in
trust with income to .4 for life, remainder to other named parties. See United States v.
Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969). More recently the Tax Court has applied the recipro-
cal trust doctrine in a situation with only crossed fiduciary powers and no crossed beneficial
interests. Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977).
8. Stern v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1943).
9. In community property jurisdictions, each spouse is deemed to be the owner of an
undivided one-half interest in each community property asset. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 5105 (West Supp. 1979); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2399 (West 1971); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975). It follows logically, then, that each spouse is an equal grantor
with respect to transferred community property assets. See Estate of Hinds v. Commis-




ing to grantor trusts.' ° Sections 671 through 677 of the Internal Revenue
Code determine when the grantor will be deemed the owner of an inter
vivos trust for income tax purposes and to what extent he will be taxed on
its income as though there were no trust. " The purpose of these sections is
to tax the grantor on the income from a trust he has created during his
lifetime if he retains the right to control or enjoy the income from such
trust. 2 Section 678 outlines the instances in which a person other than the
grantor will be deemed owner of the trust and to what extent he will be
taxed on the trust's income.' 3 The income tax consequences of a transfer
by a grantor to an inter vivos trust are often inconsistent with the estate tax
consequences. " The grantor should be apprised of these possible inconsis-
tencies so that he may best achieve his dual goals of avoiding estate tax
and shifting income away from himself.
Generally, when either the grantor or a nonadverse party to the grantor
holds a power over the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or income of a
trust the exercise of which does not require the consent of an adverse
party, the grantor will be treated as the owner of the trust property to the
extent it is subject to that power; thus he will be subject to taxation on that
income. 5 Section 672(a) defines an adverse party as "any person having a
substantial beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely af-
fected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he possesses re-
specting the trust."' 6 For purposes of this section, a general power of
appointment is deemed to be a beneficial interest. A substantial interest is
one that's value in relation to the total value of the property subject to the
power is not insignificant. 7 The regulations provide no insight as to what
will constitute a "not insignificant" interest, but a corollary perhaps can be
10. A "grantor trust" is a trust in which the grantor is treated as a substantial owner of
trust corpus under provisions set forth in I.R.C. §§ 671-677. See Cowan, Use of Grantor
Trusts to Escape a Tax Shelter Without Detrimental Tax Effects, 41 J. TAX. 346 (1974).
11. I.R.C. §§ 671-677.
12. Brogan, Use of Grantor Trusts Imperiled by Maze of Disparate Income and Estate
Tax Rules, 44 J. TAX. 69 (1976).
13. I.R.C. § 678(a) states:
(a) General rule.-A person other than the grantor shall be treated as the
owner of any portion of a trust with respect to which:
(1) such person has a power exercisable solely by himself to vest the
corpus or the income therefrom in himself, or
(2) such person has previously partially released or otherwise modified
such a power and after the release or modification retains such control as
would, within the principles of sections 671-677, inclusive, subject a gran-
tor of a trust to treatment as the owner thereof.
14. For example, under I.R.C. § 674(d) a grantor may retain a power that affects the
beneficial enjoyment of trust income or corpus and yet not be subject to taxation on the
income from the trust if the retained power is exercisable only with the consent of an adverse
party. For estate tax purposes, however, retention of a power to control beneficial enjoy-
ment will result in inclusion of the trust property in the grantor's estate whether or not the
consent of an adverse party is required. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3) (1958). See also J.
PESCHEL & E. SPURGEON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS, GRANTORS AND BENEFICIARIES
4.05[AJ, [C] (1978).
15. I.R.C. § 672(a).
16. Id.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-l(a) (1960).
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drawn to section 2037(a)(2), which treats a reversionary interest that ex-
ceeds five percent of the value of the transferred property as substantial
enough to be included in the gross estate.'"
The Code, with typical circularity, defines a "nonadverse party" as any
person who is not an adverse party. 9 A trustee, by virtue of his fiduciary
responsibilities, is not necessarily an adverse party, 20 but a beneficiary of a
trust frequently is. Further confusion occurs when a person is an adverse
party as to only a part of the trust. For example, an ordinary income bene-
ficiary who holds a power over the corpus of a trust has an interest adverse
to the appointment of ordinary income, but does not have an interest ad-
verse to the appointment of income allocable to corpus, and a remainder-
man is not adverse to the exercise of a power over any ordinary income.2'
Generally, when a nonadverse party, whether or not related to the grantor,
serves as trustee, the powers held by such a trustee will be attributable to
the grantor, and any adverse tax effects that would result if the grantor
held a power will result when a nonadverse party holds that same power.
Vesting the same powers in an adverse party, however, will insulate the
grantor from these consequences, although that plan may raise income tax
problems for the party holding the power.22
As if the adverse/nonadverse distinction were not sufficiently confusing,
section 672(c) creates a third category of trust power holders, "related or
subordinate parties. 23 A related or subordinate party is a nonadverse
party who is either: (1) the grantor's spouse living with the grantor, (2) the
grantor's father, mother, issue, brother, or sister, (3) an employee of the
grantor,24 (4) a corporation or an employee of a corporation in which the
stock holdings of the grantor and the trust are significant from the view-
point of voting control, or (5) a subordinate employee of a corporation in
which the grantor is an executive.25 A person included in one of these
categories is presumed to be subservient to the wishes of the grantor re-
garding the use of any trust powers he or she may hold, although that
presumption can be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. 26
Whether a person is related or subordinate is especially important to the
application of section 674(c), which protects the grantor from taxation on
trust income if certain powers are held only by "independent trustees," no
more than half of whom are related or subordinate parties subservient to
18. See Paxton v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 923 (9th Cir.) (holding that a 3.84% interest
in a trust did not make the beneficiary an adverse party), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1916 (1975).
19. I.R.C. § 672(b). For a discussion of the meaning of "adverse party," see Brogan,
supra note 12.
20. A trustee who has no personal beneficial interest in the trust property itself is not
deemed to be an adverse party. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-l(a) (1960); see J. PESCHEL & E.
SPURGEON, supra note 14, 4.02[C].
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-I (1960).
22. See note 77 infra and accompanying text.
23. I.R.C. § 672(c); see Treas. Reg. § 1.672(c)-1 (1960).
24. See Rev. Rul. 66-160, 1966-1 C.B. 164 (director of corporation is not per se an
employee within ambit of § 672(c)).





By definition, a grantor's spouse or child, for example, can be an adverse
party rather than a related or subordinate party. This situation shields the
grantor from income taxation, provided that the beneficiary's interest in
the trust is substantial and would be adversely affected by the grantor's use
of his powers regarding the trust. The Commissioner has often argued
that, regardless of such a person's interest in the trust, family solidarity
removes him from the adverse party category.28 A number of courts have
been unwilling to agree, however.29 In Laganas v. Commissioner,3° for ex-
ample, the grantor's wife had a ten percent interest in the trust income and
corpus as a trust beneficiary. She served as cotrustee with her grantor-
husband. Although ninety percent of the trust income was taxable to the
grantor because of the powers he had retained as trustee over his ninety
percent interest in the trust, the remaining ten percent, representing his
wife's interest, was not taxed to the husband. The court stated that the
preferable rule is that "each wife stands on her own feet" and therefore
can hold interests that are truly adverse to those of her husband.3' Al-
though courts can be expected to scrutinize such situations closely, the
family relationship should not, in itself, disqualify an otherwise adverse
party.
C. Estate Taxation
The grantor's selection of a trustee and determination of the powers and
limitations of the trustee must be made with great care. If the grantor is
deemed to have retained a right to control the beneficial enjoyment of an
inter vivos trust, no matter how inadvertent the retention the value of the
trust corpus will be included in the grantor's gross estate at his death pur-
suant to section 2036 or 2038.32 Moreover, section 2042 may trigger inclu-
sion if the grantor retains incidents of ownership in life insurance policies
held in a trust.33 Even if a testamentary trust is created with the value of
the corpus included in the grantor's estate, care should be exercised to
make certain that part or all of the corpus is not subsequently included in
the estate of the trustee-beneficiary because of the powers or potential
powers that he holds in the trust. Section 2041, which includes trust corpus
subject to general powers of appointment in the estates of holders of such
27. Id. § 674(c); see text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
28. See Commissioner v. Katz, 139 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. Prouty,
115 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1940); Lillian M. Newman, I T.C. 921 (1943).
29. But see Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S.
706 (1940), in which the court stated that a wife's interest may not be considered adverse to
that of her husband.
30. 281 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1960).
31. Id. at 735.
32. See Brogan, supra note 12, at 70-71 (analysis of I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038).
33. I.R.C. § 2042. "Generally speaking, the term [incidents of ownership] has reference
to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy." Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958); see 2 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXA-
TION 1 17.10 (1959).
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powers,3 4 frequently is the most troublesome provision for a trustee-benefi-
ciary. Section 2042, however, can also give rise to inclusion, especially in
jurisdictions in which the trustee has certain fiduciary powers over life in-
surance policies on his life owned by the trust."
Section 2036(a) includes in the decedent's gross estate the value of prop-
erty that he transferred during his life but over which he retained certain
powers.36 The powers falling within section 2036(a)(1), the retention of
possession or enjoyment of the corpus or the income therefrom, are outside
the scope of this discussion as the selection of a trustee has little effect on
the ultimate question of estate tax liability.37 More pertinent is the power
that triggers inclusion under section 2036(a)(2): the right to designate who
shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom. 38
Overlapping section 2036 is section 2038, which includes in a grantor's
estate any trust property the enjoyment of which was subject to change at
the date of his death through the exercise of a power to alter, amend, or
revoke, either by the grantor alone or in conjunction with any other per-
son.39 Section 2038 also includes trust property if the decedent relin-
quished any such power in contemplation of death.' For transfers made
after June 22, 1936, section 2038(a)(1) provides that property subject to
powers in whatever capacity exercisable and without regard to their source
34. I.R.C. § 2041.
35. See Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
977 (1976); Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Estate of Skifter v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972); Estate of Freuhauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d
80 (6th Cir. 1970).
36. I.R.C. § 2036(a) states:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his
death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income from, the
property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income there-
from.
37. But see discussions of income in discharge of a support obligation, accompanying
notes 160-62 infra, and retention of voting rights of corporate stock, accompanying notes
180-81 infra.
38. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a)(ii), .2036-1(b)(3), T.D. 6501, 1960-2
C.B. 271.
39. I.R.C. § 2038(a); Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958).
40. If a power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate would have resulted in the
inclusion of an interest in property in a decedent's gross estate under section
2038 if it had been held until the decedent's death, the relinquishment of the
power in contemplation of the decedent's death within 3 years before his death
results in the inclusion of the same interest in property in the decedent's gross
estate, except to the extent that the power was relinquished for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(e)(1) (1958). This regulation does not reflect the change in the "in
contemplation of death" concept brought about by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 2001(c)(l)(K), 90 Stat. 1852 (codified at I.R.C. § 2038(a)).
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is included in the decedent's estate.4 ' At least one court, however, has re-
fused to read that language literally. In Estate of Reed v. United States42
the decedent had made an irrevocable, fee simple transfer of family stocks
to his daughter. Several years later, on the eve of her marriage, the daugh-
ter created an inter vivos trust with the stocks as corpus and named her
parents as cotrustees, giving them flexible fiduciary powers. The court re-
fused to include the stocks in the estate of the decedent-trustee, holding
that section 2038(a)(1) applies only when the power derives from a direct
reservation retained by the decedent at the time of transfer or from the
conditions of the original transfer.43 Since the decedent had not retained
any powers, the fact that he held some fiduciary power as a result of a
totally unrelated reconveyance was irrelevant.
In addition, the gross estate of a grantor or, at least in the Fifth Circuit,
of a trustee," will include the value of life insurance proceeds payable on
his death if the insured possessed at his death any of the "incidents of
ownership" under the policies, whether exercisable alone or in conjunction
with another.45 Incidents of ownership include the right to change benefi-
ciaries, to surrender, cancel, or assign the policy, or to borrow against the
cash surrender value.' The retention of only one incident of ownership is
sufficient to cause inclusion of the full value of the proceeds in the dece-
dent's estate.47
Finally, under section 2041 a decedent's gross estate includes the v alue
of assets over which the decedent held a general power of appointment,
even though he did not own the assets during his lifetime.48 With certain
exceptions, a general power of appointment is a power to appoint trust
property to one's self or one's creditors, estate, or estate's creditors. 49 Sec-
tion 2041 will not operate to tax the grantor of a trust; to the extent he has
retained a power of appointment, the property will be included in the
grantor's estate under sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038.50 Section 2041 will
operate, however, to tax a trust beneficiary or a trustee who holds a general
41. I.R.C. § 2038(a)(I).
42. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,073 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
43. Id. at 87,480. Section 2038 applies to any power over enjoyment of the property or
income, even though the income beneficiary and remainderman are identical. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2038-1(a) (1958).
44. See text accompanying notes 170-76 infra.
45. I.R.C. § 2042(a).
46. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(4) (1958).
47. See Rev. Rul. 61-123, 1961-2 C.B. 151, in which it was held that retention of a right
to change the beneficiary of an airline passenger accident insurance policy caused inclusion
of the proceeds in the passenger's gross estate despite the inability of the insured actually to
exercise that right.
48. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2).
49. Id. § 2041(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c) (1958). The most important exception
to this definition of "general power of appointment" is the existence of an "ascertainable
standard" limiting the distributive power of the power holder. Examples of powers limited
by the requisite standard include "powers exercisable for the holder's 'support,' 'support in
reasonable comfort,' [and] 'maintenance in health and reasonable comfort.'" Id. § 20.2041-
I (c)(2).
50. See notes 77-84 infra and accompanying text.
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power of appointment by virtue of provisions in the trust instrument. The
property subject to the general power will be taxed to the power holder's
estate whether the power was exercisable inter vivos or by will and
whether or not it was actually exercised, as long as no preconditions pre-
vented the decedent from exercising the power.51
II. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF POWERS GIVEN TO TRUSTEES
The preceding overview of income and estate taxation is intended to
serve as the background for a closer examination of the pitfalls and hidden
dangers lurking in typical trust provisions. When a client and potential
grantor insists on maintaining the greatest possible measure of control over
the trust property without incurring adverse income or estate tax conse-
quences, several questions arise: Which powers can the grantor safely be
given alone? Which must he share with an independent trustee? Which
may be given to a close relative as trustee or to a beneficiary? Which
should no interested party hold in any event?52
A. Power to Control Benefcial Enjoyment
Income Tax Consequences. Creating a tax-safe inter vivos trust when the
grantor is anxious to retain control over the selection of beneficiaries and
the amounts they are to receive is fraught with possible pitfalls. The rules
are particularly complex regarding the income tax consequences of hold-
ing a power over beneficial enjoyment. Section 674(a) states the general
rule that the grantor will be treated as the owner of any portion of the trust
over which he, or a nonadverse party, or both of them in conjunction have
a power to control the beneficial enjoyment of the trust corpus or income,
unless the exercise of that power is subject to the approval of an adverse
party, as defined in section 672(a). 3 If section 674(a) applies, income of
the trust will be deemed income of the grantor. Section 674(a) encom-
passes the power to distribute income among income beneficiaries or re-
maindermen, as well as the power to allocate corpus among remaindermen
or to use it for an income beneficiary; thus, every power to accumulate
income and invade corpus may constitute a taxable power, unless strictly
limited. Section 674(a) also applies if the grantor or a nonadverse party
has the power to add to the beneficiaries under the trust, except when such
power is available solely to provide for after-born or after-adopted chil-
dren or when a beneficiary has the power to substitute other beneficiaries
to succeed to all or a part of his interest.55
The catchall rule of section 674(a) is mitigated by the exceptions enu-
51. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(b) (1958).
52. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
53. I.R.C. § 674(a). See generally Beausang, Estate and Gift Tax Consequences of Ad-
ministrative Powers, 115 TR. & EST. 246 (1976).
54. See Turley, Section 674: Mr. Ciford's Enigmatic Progeny, 9 Hous. L. REV. 928
(1972).
55. I.R.C. §§ 674(b)(5), (6), (7), 674(c), (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)-2(b) (1960).
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merated in sections 674(b), (c), and (d). 6 Section 674(b) powers can be
held without income tax consequences to the grantor by any person in any
capacity, including the grantor or a member of his immediate family.
57
These powers include:
(1) Thepower to apply income/or the support of a dependent. The exer-
cise of this power may give rise to income taxation to the holder under
section 677(b)," but mere possession of the power has no effect on the
holder. 9 For purposes of this exception to section 674(a) only, if the gran-
tor holds a power to apply income for a dependent's support, he must hold
it as a trustee or cotrustee.6° The other section 674(b) exceptions are appli-
cable regardless of whether the powers are held as a trustee or in an indi-
vidual capacity.6"
(2) The power to affect beneficial enjoyment only after a ten-year pe-
rod.62 If the trust is drawn within the bounds of section 673, merely hav-
ing the power will not cause the grantor to be taxed on the trust income
during the specified period. At the end of the ten-year period, however,
the grantor will be treated as the owner of the trust unless his power is
relinquished.
(3) The power to allocate among charitable benefciaries.6 3 As long as
all beneficiaries are charitable entities and their interests in the trust are
payable for purposes specified in section 170(c), the grantor or any other
person may hold the power to determine the beneficial enjoyment of trust
corpus or income without income tax consequences to the grantor.
(4) The power to distribute corpus.6 4 The grantor or any other party
may have the power to allocate the corpus among the trust beneficiaries
(whether income or corpus beneficiaries) if the power is limited by a "rea-
sonably definite standard., 65 Acceptable standards include distributions
for health, education, support, or maintenance of the beneficiary; for his
reasonable support and comfort; to enable him to maintain his accustomed
standard of living; or to meet an emergency.66 The grantor may also dis-
56. I.R.C. § 674(b), (c), (d).
57. Id. § 674(b); see Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-I (1960).
58. Section 677(b) treats the grantor as owner of income from trust property to the
extent that such income is actually applied or distributed for the support of a beneficiary that
the grantor is legally obligated to support. See text accompanying notes 153-56 infra.
59. I.R.C. § 674(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(l) (1960).
60. By its terms, the exception of § 674(b)(1) operates in conjunction with § 677(b),
which specifically allows the grantor to hold such power "as trustee or cotrustee." Treas.
Reg. § 1.677(b)-i(e) (1960).
61. Id. § 1.674(b)-l(a).
62. I.R.C. § 674(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(2) (1960).
63. I.R.C. § 674(b)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(4) (1960). But see Rev. Rul. 77-58,
1977-1 C.B. 175 (power granted to trustee by state law allowing him to invade trust for
benefit of donor invalidates otherwise qualifying charitable remainder trust).
64. I.R.C. § 674(b)(5); Treas. Reg.§ 1.674(b)-l(b)(5) (1960).
65. I.R.C. § 674(b)(5)(A).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-1(b)(5)(i) (1960). A properly drawn distribution power for
this purpose may also satisfy the requirements of I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A). This makes the
wording of the standard doubly important, for a defectively drawn standard could, via the
operation of id. §§ 674, 678 & 2041, subject the holder of the power to estate as well as
income taxation. See the discussion of Rev. Rul. 77-60, 1977-1 C.B. 282, note 92 infra, in
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tribute corpus to a current income beneficiary even without such a stan-
dard, but the distribution must be chargeable to that beneficiary's share of
the corpus.67
(5) The power to withhold income temporarily.68 The grantor may re-
tain the power to postpone enjoyment of the ordinary income of the trust
by the current income beneficiaries, as long as any accrued income must
ultimately be payable to those beneficiaries or their estates. 69 If any cur-
rent income beneficiary is a minor or is under some other legal disability,
the grantor may accumulate the income payable to that beneficiary and
add it to the trust corpus without attributing the accumulation to the bene-
ficiary's share.7
0
In addition to the powers discussed above, any trustee except the grantor
or his spouse, if living with the grantor, may hold without adverse tax con-
sequences the power to distribute, apportion, or accumulate income to or
for the beneficiaries or within a class of beneficiaries if the power is limited
by a "reasonably definite standard which is set forth in the trust instru-
ment." The trustee may be empowered to act alone or in conjunction
with other trustees, and need not secure the approval of any other per-
son.72 Moreover, the trustee need not satisfy the conditions of sections
674(b)(6) or (7) concerning the accumulation of income for current income
beneficiaries and the allocation of income distributions to separate
shares.73 There is no requirement that the trustee be an adverse party;
presumably a child of the grantor could exercise the power if appropriately
limited, whether or not that child has an interest in the income. If the
child does have an interest, however, and that child alone holds the power
to distribute income, he may be taxed on the trust income, or a portion
thereof, under section 678(a). This power to allocate income may also be
held by the grantor or his spouse as trustee as long as its exercise requires
the consent of an adverse party.74
Independent trustees may hold the power to distribute, apportion, or
accumulate income or to pay out corpus to or for the beneficiaries or
among a class thereof.75 If section 674(a) is applicable, it should override
section 674(c), allowing the grantor to hold such a distribution power if the
which the I.R.S. ruled that an invasion power created "to continue the donee's accustomed
standard of living" was not a sufficiently ascertainable standard to avoid inclusion under
I.R.C. § 2041(b)(I)(A).
67. I.R.C. § 674(b)(5)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(5)(ii) (1960).
68. I.R.C. § 674(b)(6); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(6) (1960).
69. I.R.C. § 674(b)(6); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(6) (1960).
70. I.R.C. § 674(b)(7); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(7) (1960).
71. I.R.C. § 674(d); see text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)-l (1960).
73. Id.; see notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
74. I.R.C. § 674(a); see Bromberg & Fortson, Selection of a Trustee: Tax and Other
Considerations, 19 Sw. L.J. 523, 540 (1965).
75. I.R.C. § 674(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(c)-i (1960). An independent trustee is defined
as "a trustee or trustees, none of whom is the grantor, and no more than half of whom are




power can be exercised only with the consent of an adverse party.76
Consideration should be given to the operation of section 678 any time a
grantor contemplates naming a trust beneficiary as a trustee or successor
trustee or giving the beneficiary any power that would subject a grantor to
income taxation if he himself held it.77 That section treats any beneficiary
as the owner of the trust corpus, provided that the grantor is not otherwise
deemed the owner, if the beneficiary holds a power, exercisable by him
alone, to vest either trust corpus or income in himself.
7 8
Estate Tax Consequences. Under sections 2036 and 2038, retention by the
grantor of the right to control the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or
income of a trust may cause inclusion of the trust property subject to such
power in his gross estate.79 If the grantor names himself trustee and, as
trustee, retains unlimited discretion to distribute income among the benefi-
ciaries or to accumulate it for the remaindermen, the value of the trust
corpus is included in the grantor's estate. 0 Moreover, if an independent
trustee holds the power, and the grantor has the right to control the trustee
or to remove the trustee and substitute himself, the value of the trust
corpus is includable in the grantor's estate.8 ' In contrast to the income tax
treatment, the estate tax result is the same whether the grantor retains his
power as trustee or otherwise, whether he retains such power alone or only
in conjunction with another, whether the other party has an interest ad-
verse to the exercise of the power, and even if the power was exercisable
only upon a contingency beyond the grantor's control that did not occur
before his death.
2
It is well established that even though no reservation of a power over
enjoyment is explicitly included in the trust instrument, the grantor is
deemed to have retained that power if at, or prior to, the time of transfer
either a legally enforceable side agreement existed accomplishing the same
result or the grantor is dealing with a related party in a predetermined
manner.8 3 Nevertheless, the existence of an ascertainable standard con-
trolling the exercise of the power of the grantor to vary the interests of
76. I.R.C. § 674(a); see Bromberg & Fortson, supra note 74, at 540.
77. I.R.C. § 678; see Burch, Powers to the People. The Use of Discretionary Powers in
Estate Planning, 114 TR. & EST. 450, 499 (1975).
78. See Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225 (section 678(a) treats widow with power to
vest in herself certain amounts from corpus of trust as owner of that part of corpus subject to
power).
79. I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038.
80. Id. § 2036(a)(2); see Biscoe v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1957).
81. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2); see Rev. Rul. 73-21, 1973-1 C.B. 405, in which it was held that if
a trustee has the power to determine the distribution of income and the decedent-grantor
had the power to appoint himself successor trustee, the value of the trust corpus is included
in the decedent's estate. See also Estate of O'Brien v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 457
(1978), in which the court admitted parol evidence to determine whether the decedent in-
tended to appoint herself as successor trustee.
82. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3), T.D. 6501, 1960-2 C.B. 271.
83. Id. § 20.2036-1(a); Estate of Skinner v. United States, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963);
Fitzsimmons v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Wash. 1963); Estate of Marie J.
Nichol, 56 T.C. 179 (1971).
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others in the trust will prevent inclusion of the trust corpus in the grantor's
estate, provided the grantor retains no right to alter or amend the trust.84
If the grantor retains no right at the date of his death either to name
himself as trustee or to control the trustee, the trust property will not be
included in the grantor's estate, even if the trustee's power to govern the
enjoyment of the income or corpus is unrestricted by any standard.85 The
grantor's spouse or a child can be named as trustee without triggering in-
clusion under section 2036.86 If the family-member-trustee is also a bene-
ficiary, however, his power as trustee to control beneficial enjoyment of the
trust corpus should be carefully drawn to avoid the operation of section
2041(a)(2). Section 2041 provides that any person having a power, not
limited by an ascertainable standard, to appoint trust property to himself,
his estate, his creditors, or his estate's creditors holds a general power of
appointment;87 the value of all trust property subject to such a power is
included in the power holder's gross estate.8 8 The language of a standard
limiting the exercise of the power should be carefully chosen to prevent a
general power of appointment from inadvertantly being created,8 9 as the
courts have revealed a tendency to scrutinize closely all limitations of dis-
tribution standards.9" The Internal Revenue Service also construes "ascer-
tainable standards" narrowly. The Treasury Regulations list "support in
his accustomed manner of living" as an ascertainable standard and state
that "support" and "maintenance" are synonymous and not limited to the
bare necessities. 9 Yet in Revenue Ruling 77-60,92 the Service determined,
after looking at state law, that the standard "to continue the donee's accus-
84. See Estate of Robert W. Weir, 17 T.C. 409 (1951); Estate of C. Dudley Wilson, 13
T.C. 869 (1949), afd, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951); Estate of Walter E. Frew, 8 T.C. 1240
(1947).
85. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b)(3), .2038-1(a)(3) (1958); see Rev. Rul. 73-142, 1973-1
C.B. 405 (state court determined decedent's power to appoint himself as trustee was invalid,
resulting in value of trust corpus not being included in decedent's estate).
86. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b)(3), .2038-1(a)(3) (1958).
87. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1); see notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
88. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(a)(1) (1958).
89. "A power is limited by [an ascertainable] standard if the extent of the holder's duty
to exercise and not to exercise the power is reasonably measurable in terms of his needs for
health, education, or support (or any combination of them)." Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2)
(1958).
90. See Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234, 235 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1964) ("reasonable needs and
proper expenses" not an ascertainable standard); Schlotterer v. United States, 421 F. Supp.
85, 87 (W.D. Pa. 1976) ("comfort and pleasure" not an ascertainable standard); Stafford v.
United States, 236 F. Supp. 132, 133 (E.D. Wis. 1964) ("care, comfort or enjoyment" not an
ascertainable standard).
91. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2) (1958).
92. 1977-1 C.B. 282. But see Rev. Rul. 78-398, 1978-2 C.B. 237 (sole trustee-beneficiary
who had power to apply as much of trust corpus as he determined to be necessary for his
maintenance and medical care did not have general power of appointment as that power
was limited by ascertainable standard); National Office Technical Advice Memo, Letter
7914036 (Jan. 3, 1979) (same result reached with surviving spouse-trustee having power to
distribute corpus to herself to maintain standard of living to which she had been accus-
tomed); Private Letter Rul. 7838116 (June 26, 1978) (Service concluded that limitation "as
may be necessary for her reasonable comfort and support" was an ascertainable standard;
therefore, widow's power was not a general power of appointment and property subject to
that power did not qualify for marital deduction).
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tomed standard of living," was not sufficiently objective to come within the
ambit of section 2041(b)(1)(A). 93 If, however, a power, unlimited by any
ascertainable standard, can be exercised only in conjunction with either
the creator of the power or a person with a substantial interest adverse to
its exercise, it will not be considered a general power of appointment.94
In addition to examination of the problems raised by sections 2036,
2038, and 2041 that are encountered when choosing an individual to serve
as trustee, careful examination must also be given to the impact of the new
generation-skipping transfer tax rules.9" Any individual, not necessarily
one related to the grantor, who is given discretionary power to alter the
93. The Service reasoned that this "standard of living may include customary travel,
entertainment, luxury items, or other expenditures not required for meeting the donee's
'needs for health, education or support.'" 1977-1 C.B. at 283.
94. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(C); see Rev. Rul. 79-63, 1979-8 I.R.B. 41, in which the Service
found that a trust beneficiary's power of appointment is a general power even though its
exercise is subject to veto by any of several remaindermen. This Ruling thus illustrates the
"adverse interest" concept of § 2041.
95. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2622. Prior to 1976, it was possible for a family to pay estate taxes
on a piece of property only once every several generations by creating successive life estates
in children and grandchildren. See Horn, Planning Suggestions to Minimize the Effect of the
Generation-Skolping Tax, 5 EST. PLAN. 130 (1978). Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue
Code was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to correct this perceived abuse. Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1879. For an introduction to the generation-
skipping tax, see J. PESCHEL & E. SPURGEON, supra note 14, 10.04; Weinstock, The.A-B-C's
of Generation Skoiping Trusts, 52 TAXES 68 (1974). While the generation-skipping tax is
extremely complex and defies general summary, the following excerpt from the House Com-
mittee's report is useful:
Under your committee's bill, a new chapter 13 is added to the Internal Rev-
enue Code, which imposes a tax in the case of generation-skipping transfers
under a trust or similar arrangement upon the distribution of the trust assets to
a generation-skipping heir (for example, a great-grandchild of the transferor)
or upon the termination of an intervening interest in the trust (for example,
the termination of an interest held by the transferor's grandchild).
Basically, a generation-skipping trust is one which provides for a splitting of
the benefits between two or more generations which are younger than the gen-
eration of the grantor of the trust. The generation-skipping tax would not be
imposed in the case of outright transfers. In addition, the tax would not be
imposed if the grandchild had (1) nothing more than a right of management
over the trust assets or (2) a limited power to appoint the trust assets among
the lineal descendants of the grantor.
The tax is to be substantially equivalent to the estate tax which would have
been imposed if the property had been actually transferred outright to each
successive generation. For example, where a trust is created for the benefit of
the grantor's grandchild, with remainder to the great-grandchild, then, upon
the death of the grandchild, the tax is to be computed by adding the
grandchild's portion of the trust assets to the grandchild's estate, and comput-
ing the tax at the grandchild's marginal transfer tax rate. In other words, for
purposes of determining the amount of the tax, the grandchild would be
treated under the bill as a 'deemed transferor' of the trust property.
The grandchild's marginal estate tax rate would be used as a measuring rod
for purposes of determining the tax imposed on the generation-skipping trans-
fer, but the grandchild's estate would not be liable for the payment of the tax.
Instead, the tax would generally be paid out of the proceeds of the trust prop-
erty. However, the trust would be entitled to any unused portion of the
grandchild's unified transfer tax credit, the credit for tax on prior transfers, the
charitable deduction (if part of the trust property were left to charity), the
credit for State inheritance taxes and a deduction for certain administrative
expenses.
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beneficial enjoyment of the income or corpus of a trust has a "power" over
the trust96 and, therefore, is a "beneficiary" for purposes of imposing the
generation-skipping tax.97 Prior to the passage of the Revenue Act of
1978, if the individual trustee was of a younger generation than the gran-
tor98 and there was no other younger generation beneficiary of the same
generation as the trustee, a generation-skipping tax was imposed. 99
The Revenue Act of 1978 amended section 2613(e) to exclude from the
term "power" a distribution power held by an individual trustee who has
no interest in the trust, is not related or subordinate to the grantor, and has
no present or future power in the trust other than that of disposing of in-
come or corpus to designated beneficiaries."° Although eliminating one
drafting problem, this amendment raises another. While incorporating the
section 672(c) income tax concept of related or subordinate parties, 10 sec-
tion 2613 broadens this category of tainted persons to include any trust
beneficiary's spouse, parent, siblings, or lineal descendants.10 2  The
amended section 2613, unlike section 672(c), also includes the stock hold-
ings of any beneficiary in determining whether a corporate trustee or cor-
porate employer of the trustee is controlled to a significant extent by
interested persons.'0 3 Moreover, section 2613 now labels as subordinate
any employee of a corporation in which a beneficiary is an executive. 1°4
The resulting inconsistency between income and estate taxation and the
generation-skipping tax means that, for example, although the grantor's
son-in-law, the spouse of a trust beneficiary, can hold, as trustee, a power
to distribute, apportion, or accumulate income or corpus without en-
gendering income or estate tax to the grantor, possession of that same
power can now trigger generation-skipping tax liability.
Even before the Revenue Act of 1978, section 2613(e) provided an im-
portant exception to the definition of a "power." If the individual trustee's
sole substantive power is the disbursement of trust income or corpus to
beneficiaries who are lineal descendants of the grantor and who are all of a
generation younger than the individual trustee, then the trustee's power is
not treated as a "power" for generation-skipping purposes. 1 5 This excep-
tion is quite narrow, however, as it will not apply if there is a younger
H. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3401-02.
96. I.R.C. § 2613(d)(2).
97. Id. § 2613(c)(3).
98. Id. § 2611(c) enumerates seven intricate rules for determining the generation to
which any person not the grantor belongs. See Bloom, The Generation-Skpping Loophole.-
Narrowed but Not Closed, by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 53 WASH. L. REV. 31, 46 (1977).
99. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006(a), 90 Stat. 1879 (codified at
I.R.C. § 2613(c)(3), (d)(2)).
100. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(n)(2), 92 Stat. 2935.
101. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
102. I.R.C. § 2613(e)(2)(B)(ii).
103. Id. (iii).
104. Id. (iv).105. Id. § 2613(e).
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generation beneficiary who is a nonlineal descendant of the grantor, for
example the spouse of a lineal descendant.
B. Power to Revoke or Terminate the Trust
Income Tax Consequences. Section 676 provides that the grantor of an
inter vivos trust will be treated as the owner of the corpus, and thus taxed
on the income attributable to such corpus, if either he or a nonadverse
party has the power to revoke the trust and revest title to the trust property
in the grantor."° If the grantor cannot exercise that power for a period of
at least ten years from the inception of the trust, the trust income for that
period will not be attributed to the grantor.0 7 Unless the power is relin-
quished at the expiration of the ten-year period, however, the grantor will
then be taxed on the trust income. 08 Because an independent trustee is
not per se an adverse party in interest for purposes of sections 671 to
677,109 lodging a power to revoke with an independent corporate trustee
has an effect identical to that of giving the power to the grantor. If the
power is held by an adverse party, however," o the possession and exercise
of the power will not result in trust income being attributed to the gran-
tor. l'
l
Although vesting the power to revoke in an adverse party will effectively
shield the grantor from income tax liability, it may give rise to liability for
the holder of the power if revocation would serve to vest title to the prop-
erty in the holder." 2 Section 678(a) provides that, to the extent the grantor
is not deemed the owner, the person who alone holds the power to vest
income or corpus in himself will be deemed the owner of the trust for the
purposes of sections 671 to 677.'3
Estate Tax Consequences. When a grantor of an inter vivos trust holds the
power at his death, as trustee or otherwise, to revoke the trust, or when he
has released such a power within three years of death, the portion of the
trust property subject to the power will be included in his gross estate." 4
106. Id. § 676; see Osterberg, Current Trends and Techniques in the Use of and Drafting of
Revocable Trusts, 47 J. TAX. 332 (1977).
107. I.R.C. §§ 676(b), 673(a). It is immaterial that the power to revoke is vested in the
grantor at the time of the transfer, as long as the power cannot be exercised for at least 10
years. Treas. Reg. § 1.676(b)-I (1960).
108. I.R.C. § 676(b).
109. "A trustee is not an adverse party merely because of his interest as trustee." Treas.
Reg. § 1.672(a)-1 (1960); see Fulham v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1940).
110. See notes 15-21 supra and accompanying text.
111. I.R.C. § 676(a).
112. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 849 (2d Cir. 1947).
113. I.R.C. § 678(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.678(a)-I(a) (1960).
114. I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1); see, e.g., Cohn v. United States, 371 F.2d 642, 645 (2d Cir.
1967). Contrary to many other state statutes, the Texas Trust Act provides that a trust is
revocable unless specifically declared to be irrevocable. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
7425b-41 (Vernon 1960). In Texas, therefore, the irrevocable nature of the trust must be
expressly set out in the instrument, lest the grantor be deemed to hold the power of revoca-
tion at his death by operation of law. Estate of Alvin Hill, 64 T.C. 867 (1975), afl'd, 568 F.2d
1365 (5th Cir. 1978).
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The identical result obtains even if the grantor holds the power only in
conjunction with another, and even if it can be exercised only for another's
benefit." 5 Even though the power to revoke is vested in a trustee who is
not the grantor, if the grantor has an unrestricted power to remove the
trustee and appoint himself, the property subject to the power to revoke
will be included in the grantor's estate."16 On the other hand, if the power
can be exercised by the grantor only with the consent of all parties having
a vested or contingent interest in the property, that property will not be
included in the grantor's estate regardless of whether he is serving as
trustee. ' 17
Since the income tax distinction between adverse and nonadverse par-
ties plays no part in estate tax treatment, presumably the grantor can give a
family-member-beneficiary the power to revoke without the corpus being
included in the grantor's estate, even if upon revocation the property
would revert to the grantor." 18 Although vesting the power to revoke in a
beneficiary would shield the grantor from estate tax, the disposition of the
assets upon revocation may cause the property to be included in the
power-holder's estate. If the power effectively allows the holder to appoint
assets to himself, such property over which he alone has that power is in-
cluded in his estate." 9 But if several beneficiaries whose interests are all
substantially adverse to one another hold the power and can only exercise
it jointly, property subject to such power is not included in the estates of
either the decedent or any of the power holders.'
20
Trust instruments frequently contain a provision allowing the trustee to
terminate the trust if the amount of the corpus does not warrant the cost of
continuing the trust or if its administration would otherwise be impracti-
cal.' 2' Such a provision is deemed to be based upon an objective, external
standard outside the control of the grantor or the discretion of the trustee
and, therefore, does not constitute a power to appoint, possess, or enjoy for
the purposes of sections 2036, 2038, or 2041.22 If the trustee is given the
power to terminate in his sole judgment and discretion, however, no ascer-
tainable standard exists.' 23
115. I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1); Hauptfuhrer v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1952).
116. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-I(a)(3) (1958); see Mathey v. United States, 491 F.2d 481 (3d
Cir. 1974).
117. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a)(2) (1958).
118. Id. § 20.2038-l(a)(3); Estate of Anna Ball Kneeland, 34 B.T.A. 816 (1936). As long
as the power is held by an adverse party, the result will be consistent with the income tax
ramifications of I.R.C. § 676(a) and totally shield the grantor from both income and estate
tax.
119. I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(2), (b)(l); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(a), -l(b)(l), -l(b)(3) (1958); see
Stafford v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 132, 134 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
120. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(l)(C)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(c)(2) (1958).
121. See, e.g., E. BELSHEIM, MODERN LEGAL FORMS § 9273 (1968); J. HELLMUTH, MOD-
ERN TRUST FORMS No. 3.05 (1969).
122. See, e.g., Estate of McCoy v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (W.D. Tenn.
1974), ag'd, 511 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1975).
123. Estate of McCord v. United States, 516 F.2d 832, 835-36 (6th Cir. 1975), aj7'g 75-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 13,042 (E.D. Mich. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975).
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C. Power to Become or Change the Trustee
Income Tax Consequences. If the grantor has an unrestricted power to
remove the trustee and substitute any person, including himself, as trustee,
the income of the trust will be attributed to him.124 Section 674(b), how-
ever, enumerates certain powers that a grantor can possess without trigger-
ing income taxation to himself; if the trustee's only powers are included
within the section 674(b) list, the fact that the grantor can substitute him-
self as trustee is without consequence for income tax purposes.' 25 Section
674(c) allows an independent trustee, not related or subordinate to the
grantor, to exercise certain powers without triggering income recognition
to the grantor. 26 If the grantor's power to remove a trustee vested with
such powers is limited by the requirement that he must substitute another
independent trustee for the removed one, whatever exceptions from in-
come taxation that would have applied to the trust if the grantor had no
removal power are preserved despite his limited power.
12 7
If a beneficiary of the trust has the unrestricted right to remove the in-
dependent trustee and substitute himself, for income tax purposes he will
be regarded as the trustee, whether or not the power is exercised. 2 8 More-
over, if the trustee subject to removal has sole discretion in making distri-
butions of trust corpus or income to the beneficiary, the beneficiary who is
deemed a trustee via his removal power will be taxed on the trust income
that could have been distributed to him or on the income allocable to trust
corpus that could have been so distributed, whether or not distribution is
actually made. 129 If the beneficiary becomes or is deemed to be a co-
trustee, however, and the trustees can act only in conjunction in making
distributions of trust property, income of the trust will not be attributed to
the beneficiary. 3 °
Estate Tax Consequences. Retention by the grantor of a power to remove
or change the trustee has no estate tax significance in and of itself. Accord-
ing to Revenue Ruling 73-21, however, if such a right is coupled with an
unrestricted power to appoint anyone as trustee, including himself, the
grantor is deemed to hold all the powers of the trustee, even though the
power to name a successor trustee is conditioned on the death, resignation,
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)-2(a) (1960). The Regulations additionally state that a power
to remove a trustee, exercisable only upon limited conditions that do not exist during the
taxable year, will not trigger attribution of the trust income to the grantor. Id. See generaly
J. PESCHEL & E. SPURGEON, supra note 14, 1 5.04.
125. I.R.C. § 674(b) lists eight such powers. If the grantor was originally permitted to
possess these powers without attracting trust income to himself, no reason exists why a dif-
ferent result should obtain merely because the trustee held the powers prior to the grantor.
126. I.R.C. § 674(c) allows such a trustee to distribute, apportion, or accumulate income
for a beneficiary, and to pay out corpus to or for a beneficiary.
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)-2(a) (1960).
128. Id. § 1.678(a)-l(a) (1960).
129. I.R.C. § 678(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.678(a)-l(a) (1960).
130. I.R.C. § 678(a)(1) requires that the power to vest corpus or income be exercisable
"solely by himself." Id.; see Rev. Rul. 67-268, 1967-2 C.B. 226, in which the Internal Reve-
nue Service recognized this rule even where the beneficiary married her cotrustee.
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or incapacity of the original trustee and in fact is never used.' 3 ' Moreover,
the prior conduct of the grantor in exercising a replacement power appar-
ently is insufficient to override the presumption that the grantor intended
to reserve the right to appoint himself as successor trustee. In Estate of
Farrel v. United States 32 the grantor created an irrevocable trust for her
grandchildren, retaining the right to appoint a successor trustee upon the
death or resignation of either cotrustee. The trustees had wide discretion
in making distributions from the trust income and principal. On two sepa-
rate occasions before her death, the grantor exercised her power by ap-
pointing third persons as successor trustees. Despite this show of good
faith, the Court of Claims concluded that the value of the trust property
was includable in the grantor's gross estate under section 2036(a)(2) as she
had retained a power to control enjoyment, even though that power would
not cause inclusion under section 2038 because it was not exercisable by
the grantor at the moment of her death. 133 Contrast Farrel with Revenue
Ruling 77-182,' in which the grantor of an inter vivos trust retained the
power to appoint a successor corporate trustee if the original trustee re-
signed or was judicially removed. The Service determined that the quali-
fied power to appoint only a corporation as successor trustee was not
sufficient to trigger inclusion under section 2036, as it "did not amount to a
power to remove the original trustee that, in effect, would have endowed
the decedent with the trustee's discretionary control over trust income."'
135
A further limitation on the scope of section 2036(a)(2) requires that the
grantor must have actually retained the replacement power; de facto con-
trol of the administrative powers of the trustee by virtue of the trustee's
acquiescence will not cause inclusion.' 36
What is the tax significance of a power retained by the grantor to ap-
point anyone other than himself as successor trustee? Revenue Rulings 73-
21 and 77-182 do not provide the answer; neither does case law. Both a
commentator and a court, in a dictum, have separately reasoned that if the
trustee's discretion is absolute, retention of this power should result in in-
clusion of the trust corpus in the grantor's estate, as it effectively empowers
the grantor to shop around for a trustee that will accede to his wishes.' 37
As neither the Code nor the regulations specifically address such a power,
however, the question of whether it can be used without adverse tax conse-
quences is apparently still open. ,
The determination of whether a grantor actually has the power to
131. Rev. Rul. 73-21, 1973-1 C.B. 405; see Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b)(3), .2038-1(a)(3),
.2041-1(b)(l) (1958).
132. 553 F.2d 637 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
133. Id. at 642-43. The court justified this discrepancy between results by noting that
§ 2038(a) "looks at the problem from the decedent's death," while § 2036(a) "looks forward
from the time the decedent made the transfer." 553 F.2d at 640.
134. 1977-1 C.B. 273.
135. Id.
136. Estate of Hilton W. Goodwyn, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 740 (1973).
137. Coming v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 907, 914 (1955); Burch, supra note 77, at 498-99.
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change trustees is made under applicable state law.'38 In James v. United
States139 the three grantors of a trust retained the joint right to change
trustees. Applying Nebraska common law, the court held: that the joint
right had terminated with the earlier death of one of the grantors. ,40 Since
the right to change trustees had been extinguished before the decedent's
death, the trust assets were not included in her estate. In Durst v. United
States14 1 the decedent-grantor created an irrevocable trust, reserving to
himself the power to appoint individual trustees to serve with the corporate
trustee. After reviewing the trust instrument as a whole, as well as examin-
ing extrinsic evidence of the grantor's intention, the court concluded that,
under Ohio law, the grantor did not intend to allow himself to be ap-
pointed trustee.1
42
The possibility of the grantor becoming a trustee causes inclusion of the
trust corpus in the grantor's gross estate even if the grantor, as trustee, can
exercise the power to control beneficial enjoyment only in conjunction
with an adverse party. 43 If the use and enjoyment of the property is fixed
by the trust instrument, however, or if the discretionary powers of the
trustees to determine beneficial enjoyment are measured by an objective,
ascertainable, and enforceable standard, and provided that the grantor re-
tains no right to amend or alter the trust instrument, he may become a
trustee with no adverse estate tax consequence. 44 The value of a trust
corpus will be included in the gross estate of a beneficiary who has the
unrestricted power to remove a trustee and appoint himself as successor-
trustee if the trust instrument empowers the trustee to make distributions,
not subject to an ascertainable standard, to beneficiaries including him-
self. 14
5
D. Power to Allocate Receipts and Disbursements
Income Tax Consequences. For administrative convenience a trustee will
frequently be given the discretionary power to allocate trust receipts and
disbursements between income and corpus to avoid the necessity of seek-
ing court approval as to doubtful allocations.'" Section 674 states that
any party, including the grantor, may have this power, "even though ex-
pressed in broad language," without trust income being attributed to the
grantor. '141
138. Mathey v. United States, 491 F.2d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1974).
139. 448 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1978).
140. Id. at 179.
141. 409 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Pa. 1976), afl'd, 559 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1977).
142. 409 F. Supp. at 1048.
143. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3)(i) (1958).
144. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b)(3), .2038-1(a) (1958); see text accompanying notes 85-94
supra.
145. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(1) (1958) would characterize this power as a general
power of appointment.
146. See, e.g, E. BELSHEIM, supra note 121, § 9205(c)(21); J. HELLMUTH, supra note 121,
No. 10.01, at 1002.
147. I.R.C. § 674(b)(8); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(a)-l(b)(1)(iv) (1960).
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Estate Tax Consequences. The courts have concluded that retention of a
power of allocation by the grantor does not cause the trust property subject
to that power to be included in the grantor's estate under section 2036.48
With regard to trusts creating charitable remainders, the Service has ar-
gued that the power to allocate permits the trustee to allocate capital gains
to income, defeating the rights of the charitable remaindermen.' 49 Where
state law requires capital gains to be allocated to corpus' 50 or requires a
trustee to act fairly in representing the interests of all beneficiaries, 5 ' how-
ever, the remainder is ascertainable and thus deductible. 52
E. Power to Have Income or Principal Applied to Discharge Legal
Obligations
Income Tax Consequences. Authority of a trustee to make distributions of
trust income or principal for the support of persons whom the grantor is
legally obligated to support (other than the grantor's spouse) will cause the
income to be taxed to the grantor only to the extent that it is so distrib-
uted. 3 The result is the same even if the power is exercisable only with
the consent of an adverse party, and even if the grantor is not a trustee. 5
On the other hand, if a trustee has authority to distribute trust income to
either the grantor or the grantor's spouse without the approval of an ad-
verse party, that income is attributed to the grantor regardless of whether
or not it is so distributed. 5 5 If the power is exercisable by the grantor in a
nonfiduciary capacity, the income of the trust will be taxed to the grantor
as it is earned rather than as it is distributed.'56 Section 678(c) accords the
same treatment to a person other than a grantor who is deemed an owner
of the trust under section 678(a). 7
The fact that the trust instrument authorizes distributions to a person the
grantor is legally obligated to support does not create a presumption that
the distributions actually made are for support, as long as the trust instru-
ment either is silent as to the purposes for which distributions may be
148. See, e.g., Estate of Pardee, 49 T.C. 140, 146-47 (1967).
149. See Note, Charitable Remainders and the Federal Estate Tax Charitable Deduction,
40 TEMP. L.Q. 102, 109 (1966).
150. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 58-603(b) (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE § 730.03(b) (West
Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-5-2(b) (Bums Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 555.53(b) (1967); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(b) (Purdon 1975); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 7425b-27(B) (Vernon 1960).
151. See, e.g., Hughes v. Coffey, 263 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Ark. 1954); In re Estate of Weiss,
309 A.2d 793, 800 (Pa. 1973). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 183, 232
(1959).
152. Estate of Phyllis W. McGillicuddy, 54 T.C. 315 (1970).
153. I.R.C. § 677(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.677(b)-1(a), T.D. 7148, 1971-2 C.B. 251.
154. I.R.C. § 677(b). While the application of the general rule of§ 677(a) can be avoided
if income distribution requires the participation of an adverse party, § 677(b) contains no
such exception.
155. I.R.C. § 677(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-l(b)(2), T.D. 7148, 1971-2 C.B. 251.
156. Section 677(b) brings the grantor within the adverse party exception only if he holds
such discretion as trustee or cotrustee; otherwise, the grantor's discretionary power falls
within § 677(a) and that subsection's constructive distribution rules. See Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.677(a)-1(c), .677(b)-l(e), T.D, 7148, 1971-2 C.B. 251.
157. I.R.C. § 678(c).
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made or allows them to be made for any purpose. 58 The questions of
whom a given individual is legally obligated to support and what consti-
tutes support are generally answered under state law.' 9
Estate Tax Consequences. The retention by a grantor, individually or as
trustee, of the power or right to have trust income used to discharge his
legal obligations, including support, constitutes the retention of the right to
income under section 2036(a)( 1)160 and the value of the entire trust prop-
erty, less the value of any portion not subject to the power, will be included
in the grantor's gross estate.' 6 1 Unlike the income tax provisions, if trust
income may be applied to discharge the grantor's legal obligations, but the
grantor has not retained the right to do so, the value of the interest is not
includable.'
62
F. Power to Invest in and Manage Life Insurance
Income Tax Consequences. Section 677(a)(3) provides that the income of a
trust will be attributed to the grantor to the extent that it may be applied,
without the consent of an adverse party, to the payment of premiums on
policies insuring the life of the grantor or the grantor's spouse. 63 Thus, if
the trust instrument provides that trust income can be used to pay the pre-
miums on policies that insure the grantor or his spouse, the grantor is
taxed on the amount of trust income equal to such premiums. 1" The
grantor is taxed even though the policy was purchased directly by the
trustee after the creation of the trust. 165 Although a literal reading of sec-
tion 677(a)(3) would result in the grantor being taxed on trust income any
time the grantor or a nonadverse party, without the consent of an adverse
party, may apply trust income to the payment of premiums on policies
insuring the life of the grantor or the grantor's spouse, the courts have
continually held that attribution of trust income to the grantor is condi-
tioned on the presence of insurance policies in the trust corpus upon which
the premiums might have been paid.166 If a trust owns no policies, the
power of a trustee to invest in policies on the life of the grantor or his
158. Estate of C.W. Sherman, 9 T.C. 594 (1947).
159. See Wyche v. United States, FED. TAX. SERV. (P-H) 58,031 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Rev.
Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23. A parent's obligation of support in Texas is not limited to the
bare necessities. See Courville v. Courville, 568 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978, no writ).
160. Richards v. Commissioner, 375 F.2d 997, 1000 (10th Cir. 1967); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2036-1(a) (1958).
161. I.R.C. § 2036; Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1958).
162. Estate of Charles J. Babcock, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 31 (1946); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-
l(b)(2) (1958).
163. Estate of Charles J. Babcock, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 31 (1946); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-
1(b)(2) (1958). For a discussion of adverse parties, see notes 15-18 supra and accompanying
text.
164. Edward E. Rieck, 41 B.T.A. 457, 460-61 (1940), a'd, 118 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1941).
165. Arthur Stockstrom, 3 T.C. 664 (1944).
166. Frank C. Rand, 40 B.T.A. 233 (1939), af'd, 116 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1941), cer. de-




spouse should not be presumed merely because broadly worded provisions
do not expressly prohibit such investment. 167 To protect the grantor fully
from the unintentional application of section 677(a)(3), if anyone other
than an adverse party is trustee, the trust should be drawn expressly to
prohibit such trustee from purchasing insurance on the life of the grantor
or his spouse.
Estate Tax Consequences. The power to purchase life insurance, coupled
with other broad administrative powers, has been held insufficient to con-
stitute a power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust within the scope of
section 2038.168 Where the insured is also a trustee, however, problems
may arise, especially in the Fifth Circuit. The three other circuits that
have addressed the issue have found a critical distinction between general
fiduciary powers that the trustee-insured could exercise over the policies
held by the trust and fiduciary powers that could be exercised for the
fiduciary's own personal benefit.' 69 Unfortunately, in Rose v. United
States170 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals unexpectedly and inexplicably
disagreed with this distinction. In Rose the decedent had been trustee of
three trusts created by his brother for the benefit of the decedent's three
children and funded with a life insurance policy on the decedent's life. As
trustee, the decedent had the power to borrow against the policies, to with-
draw dividend accumulations and to convert the whole-life policies to en-
dowment or limited-payment life policies. The district court held,' 7 ' and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed,'72 that the mere possession of any incidents of
ownership is sufficient to invoke inclusion under section 2042, even though
those incidents are held only in a fiduciary capacity and are not exercisable
for the fiduciary's benefit. In a second case, Terriberry v. United States,I7 3
the Fifth Circuit compounded the problem by following Rose in a situa-
tion in which the decedent-insured as cotrustee was expressly prohibited
from exercising any incident of ownership except to elect a settlement op-
tion, and even that incident was expressly limited so that the decedent
could not benefit from its exercise. In light of Rose, Terriberry, and the
Internal Revenue Service's nonacquiescence 74 with the other circuits'
holdings in Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner17' and Estate of Fruehauf v.
Commissioner,176 the safest route to follow is to draft instruments that ex-
167. Coming v. Commissioner, 104 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1939). But see Nora C. Todd, 32
B.T.A. 1067 (1935), af'd, 82 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1936).
168. United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962).
169. Estate of Connelly v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 545, 549 (3d Cir. 1977) ("where the
requisite powers over policies on his life have been transferred to a decedent, with no benefi-
cial interest therein, 'such arrangement can hardly be construed as a substitute for testamen-
tary disposition on decedent's part' "); Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699, 702-
04 (2d Cir. 1972); Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80, 86 (6th Cir. 1970).
170. 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975).
171. Rose v. United States, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-1413 (1973).
172. 511 F.2d at 264-65.
173. 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1975).
174. Rev. Rul. 76-261, 76-2 C.B. 276.
175. 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
176. 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
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pressly vest all incidents of ownership in an independent fiduciary and
prohibit the insured from dealing with them.
G. Power to Vote Corporate Stock
Income Tax Consequences. Section 675 states that the grantor will be sub-
ject to taxation on the income from the trust if any person in a nonfiduci-
ary capacity has the power, without the consent of a fiduciary, to vote or
direct the voting of the stock of a corporation in which the grantor and the
trust, combined, have significant voting control. 177 The two elements of
the section, voting control and fiduciary responsibility, operate indepen-
dently of one another. Therefore, the grantor or any other person can hold
a "controlling" voting rights power without the grantor being treated as
owner of stock subject to that power as long as the power is held in a
fiduciary capacity. 7 ' Conversely, a grantor or any other party in a nonfi-
duciary capacity can safely vote the trust's stock if his holdings and those
of the trust are not significant in terms of voting control. 79
Estate Tax Consequences. In United States v. Byrum' 80 the Supreme Court
ruled that the grantor's retention of voting rights in family corporation
stock that he had transferred to a trust was not sufficient to cause inclusion
of the transferred shares in his estate under section 2036. In response to
the Byrum decision, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended section 2036(a)
to provide that the retention of voting rights in stock that a decedent has
transferred shall be considered, per se, the retention of enjoyment of such
stock and, therefore, will cause the value of the stock to be included in the
decedent-grantor's gross estate. 18' This congressional reaction to Byrum
went beyond the facts of that case, for the statute encompassed the reten-
tion of voting rights in large, publicly held corporations as well as small,
closely held companies, resulting in estate taxation to the grantor even
when his voting rights could in no way be equated with control of the
corporation. The Revenue Act of 1978 modified this Draconian measure,
amending section 2036 to require inclusion of stock in the grantor's gross
estate only where the decedent-grantor constructively owns twenty percent
or more of the voting stock of the corporation. 8 2
H. General Administrative Powers
In recent years numerous disputes have arisen over the substantive na-
ture and effect of supposedly purely administrative powers. 8 3 Courts have
177. I.R.C. § 675(4)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.675-1(b)(4)(i) (1960).
178. See Harvey C. Fruehauf, 12 T.C. 681 (1949). But see Shapero v. Commissioner, 165
F.2d 811 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948).
179. Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1945).
180. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
181. I.R.C. § 2036(a); see Zaritsky, The Estate and Gift Tax Revisions of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 399 (1977).
182. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(i)(1), 92 Stat. 2931.
183. See Kuney v. United States, 448 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'g69-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9306 (E.D. Wash. 1969).
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ruled, however, that no aggregation of purely administrative powers
should result in the taxation of property subject thereto.1 84
Income Tax Consequences. Section 675 is the primary income tax section
dealing with administrative powers.185 Section 675(4) identifies three pow-
ers that will be regarded as purely administrative, regardless of who holds
them, as long as the powers are exercisable only by or with the approval of
a person in a fiduciary capacity: the power to vote or direct the voting of
stock in a controlled corporation, the power to control the investment of
trust funds, and the power to substitute trust assets. The power to borrow
from the trust without adequate interest or security and the power to deal
with the corpus or income for less than adequate and full consideration
verge on being substantive rights and, therefore, under section 675(1) and
(2), can be exercised by the grantor or a nonadverse party only under cer-
tain circumstances 86 without subjecting the grantor to taxation on income
attributable to the corpus subject to these powers.
Estate Tax Consequences. The Supreme Court has held that administra-
tive and managerial powers are not, for the purposes of estate tax, powers
to control beneficial enjoyment.' 8 7 In the estate tax area the following
powers are generally deemed to be nonsubstantive, even if held by the
grantor: the power to limit the liability of a trustee; 188 the power to amend
administrative provisions having no estate, gift, or income tax signifi-
cance;' 89 the power to assist the trustee in investment decisions;' 90 the
power to invest in "nonlegal" investments;' 9 ' and the power to invest in
mutual funds.' 92
III. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FINAL DRAFTING STAGE
Considering all of the factors that must be taken into account, along
with the ramifications that result if a mistake is made, the selection of the
trustee is likely the most critical phase of the trust creation process. 193 The
task is not completed once the choice has been made, however. It then
184. Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (lst Cir. 1970); Estate of Ed-
ward E. Ford, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), a f'd per curiam, 450 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1971).
185. I.R.C. § 675; see Brogan, supra note 12, at 72 (discussion of statutory and case law
pertaining to retained administrative powers).
186. Section 675(2) creates an exception to the general rule "where a trustee (other than
the grantor) is authorized under a general lending power to make loans to any person with-
out regard to interest or security."
187. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 346 (1929).
188. Greer v. United States, 448 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1971); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
189. See United States v. Winchell, 289 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1961).
190. See Estate of Herbert L. Johnston, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 299 (1943).
191. Estate of Ralph Budd, 40 TC. 468 (1968); Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973
(1962).
192. See State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
193. For an excellent analysis of the nontax factors to be considered in appointing a
trustee, see Bromberg & Fortson, supra note 74. See also Moore, Choosing a Trustee, 8 ABA
L. NoTEs 81 (1972).
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becomes the further duty of the attorney to draw up an instrument that
will effectuate, as precisely as possible, the desires of the grantor. The fol-
lowing suggestions are offered as examples of planning and drafting tech-
niques for completing the trustee selection process.
Appointment of Trustee as Coexecutor. The trustee of a testamentary trust
who succeeds an executor may become liable for the malfeasance or non-
feasance of his predecessor if he fails to redress such conduct.' 94 As a
result of this potential liability, many corporate trustees now refuse to ac-
cept trusteeships until they have fully examined the records and account-
ings of the executor and have assured themselves that they are inheriting
no fiduciary breaches. The costs of this initial investigation are, of course,
borne by the trust. If the grantor has chosen a corporate trustee or co-
trustee, naming that trustee as coexecutor may ease and even hasten the
activation of a testamentary trust at little or no additional cost, assuming
the charge for serving as coexecutor parallels the charge for the nonex-
ecutor-trustee's initial examination. Even when the corporate trustee is
named as executor, it frequently recommends that a spouse or close family
member be named as coexecutor, for two reasons. First, the transition re-
quired by the death of a family member is often easier to bear for a person
who is actively engaged in the process of administering the estate and dis-
tributing the decedent's property. Secondly, there are numerous small
tasks required of an executor, such as locating documents, making calls to
creditors and debtors of the estate, and contacting insurance companies,
that can be done far more expeditiously and inexpensively by a family
member. The presence of a family member as coexecutor thus can speed
up administration while making it less costly to the estate.
The Distribution Standard. Often the choice of a standard for distribution
of trust income and corpus will turn on tax consequences. Whatever stan-
dard is to be used, it should be described as fully as possible, either in the
trust instrument itself or in contemporaneously executed memoranda that
will be passed on to the trustee. One noted authority suggests that the
ideal flexible trust uses an independent trustee with the power to distribute
in his sole discretion.'95 While such a limitless standard does allow for
utmost flexibility, the realities of fiduciary administration must be taken
into account. Many corporate trustees, when presented with a "sole discre-
tion" standard of distribution, choose instead to follow a conservative dis-
bursements policy as a precaution against potential liability for abuse of
discretion. If the sole discretion standard of distribution is coupled with
precatory language of the grantor precisely expressing his wishes, a cau-
tious trustee may be far more willing to distribute the trust property with a
free hand, as the grantor intended.
194. Duties and Responsibilities of a Successor Trustee, 10 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
310 (1975).
195. Covey, Use of Long Term Trusts in Estate Planning, 4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
489, 492 (1969).
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Division into Shares. The fee schedules of some banks treat every share
within a trust as a separate trust for administration purposes, resulting in
duplicate fees to a trust in which assets are divided into separate shares
before the final termination date. Other corporate trustees charge a sepa-
rate fee only when the shares within a trust require distinctive handling.
Early division of the trust property into separate shares also may result in
each share having a value less than the minimum that a corporate trustee
is willing to accept, whereas division upon termination would maintain the
trust value above the acceptable value level. A representative of the pro-
spective corporate trustee should be consulted before execution of the trust
instrument so that these problems may be anticipated and dealt with with-
out doing irreparable damage to the grantor's intentions.
Particularized Powers. If the trust property includes an asset that will re-
quire particular management or handling, a power outlining the extent of
the trustee's power and responsibility with regard to that asset should be
included in the trust instrument.'96 If the grantor desires the trustee to
manage certain business entities included in the trust corpus, he should so
provide, setting forth the scope of the trustee's duty in as much detail as is
feasible. The same should be done for the handling of any trust asset
about which the grantor is particularly concerned, for example, an heir-
loom, an art collection, or stock in a family corporation.
Removal Power. Vesting an unrestricted power of removal in the trust
beneficiaries may be of tremendous psychological and practical value. A
surviving spouse or descendant will feel far less threatened by the trustee
simply because of the existence of such power. The power also becomes
advantageous if either the trust property or beneficiary changes location
and the original trustee cannot continue to operate effectively. The re-
moval power must be drawn carefully, however, to avoid adverse tax con-
sequences. 97 If the successor can be only a corporate trustee or a
predesignated independent individual, even a "removal without cause"
provision should be tax-safe.' 98
A frequently used successor trustee clause provides that a trustee can be
replaced only by a corporate trustee with assets of at least "X" million
dollars. While the restriction is a wise one, it certainly does not circumvent
all potential trustee replacement problems. If a corporate trustee refuses or
is unable to serve because the value of the trust property has decreased to
the point that it can no longer do so profitably, turning to an alternate
corporate trustee of the same size may raise the same problem. If the gran-
tor does not want the successor trustee selection left to the courts, he
should designate individuals who either will serve as successor trustees or
196. E.g., the Texas Trust Act does not expressly empower a trustee to operate a continu-
ing business. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-25 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1978-
1979).
197. See notes 124-45 supra and accompanying text.
198. But see Burch, supra note 77, at 498-99.
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who will select a successor individual trustee in the event that a corporate
successor becomes unavailable.
Investment Advisor Rather Than Trustee. A grantor may be concerned
about the initial investment decisions that a trustee will make upon his
death, yet feel strongly that his spouse or some other individual is compe-
tent to manage the trust property. In this case consideration might be
given to appointing a bank, a broker, or a professional investment analyst
as an interim or permanent investment counselor. This is a relatively new
concept, but such services are being offered by progressively more financial
institutions, and temporary use of the collective corporate wisdom might
be the ideal compromise between a corporate trustee and an inexperienced
family member trustee. An interim advisor appointment is also practical
for a trust in which the asset value does not permit long-term corporate
management, either because a bank will decline to serve or because the
depletion by administrative costs outweighs the benefits advanced by pro-
fessional investment advice. A one-time fee for investment counseling
may be profitable for the trust under those circumstances.
Termination of Powers/Savings Clause. As income and estate tax laws
change rapidly, it is difficult for an estate planner to foresee what repercus-
sions the provisions he drafts today may have in even the near future. The
inclusion in the trust instrument of a provision terminating a power of the
trustee or rendering it void if its existence or exercise defeats the allowabil-
ity of a deduction or causes the inclusion of otherwise excluded assets will
be given effect if such a provision is valid under local law and not against
public policy. 199
IV. CONCLUSION
Every client and every trust agreement require a different combination
of the powers outlined in this Article, along with others not mentioned.
Too often a client becomes overeager at the mention of a tax savings; from
that point on he gives but scant attention to the nontax consequences of his
choice of trustee or to how life under the trustee will be for those who have
to live it. The importance of the tax consequences attending the appoint-
ment of a trustee cannot be overemphasized; nonetheless any attorney
drafting a trust should seriously attempt to convince the client to consider
adequately the nontax consequences of his or her choice of trustee.
There are crucial factors to be considered both in choosing a trustee and
in deciding what powers to give the trustee. If the grantor retains too
many powers over the trust property, he may be liable for income tax on
the trust income, and the trust property may be attributed to his estate at
his death. The tax consequences of estate planning are further compli-
cated because income tax consequences and estate tax consequences are
199. See Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. $ 12,681
(S.D. Fla. 1970).
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often inconsistent; the settlor-grantor may be considered the owner of the
property for one tax purpose but not for the other.
The possibility of adverse tax consequences mandates a careful analysis
of the income tax and estate tax provisions before drafting any trust agree-
ment. Because this area of tax law is traditionally subject to frequent
change, constant review of these laws is essential to good estate planning.
